Computer Viruses and Ethics by Spafford, Eugene H.
Purdue University 
Purdue e-Pubs 
Department of Computer Science Technical 
Reports Department of Computer Science 
1991 
Computer Viruses and Ethics 
Eugene H. Spafford 
Purdue University, spaf@cs.purdue.edu 
Report Number: 
91-061 
Spafford, Eugene H., "Computer Viruses and Ethics" (1991). Department of Computer Science Technical 
Reports. Paper 901. 
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/901 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. 
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 




Computer Viruses and Ethics
Purdue Technical Report CSD-TR-91-061
Eugene H. Spafford
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University




There has been considerable interest in computer viruses since they first appeared
in 1981, and especially in the past few years as they have reached epidemic numbers in
many personal computer environments. Viruses have been written about as a security
problem, as a social problem, and as a possible means of performing useful tasks in a
distributed manner. Most users of computers view viruses as annoying or dangerous.
Some people, however, claim that (at least some) viruses are beneficial.
This paper begins with a description of how computer viruses operate, and the
various ways simple viruses are structured. It then discusses the most common reasons
put forth to explain the writing of viruses, and discusses whether those reasons justify
the resultant damages.
1 Introduction
There has been considerable interest of late in computer viruses, and in the motives behind
the writing of viruses. Some individuals attempt to justify the writing of viruses by claiming
it is for a greater good.
This paper is a condensed, high-level description of computer viruses - their history,
structure, and how they affect computers It provides a general introduction to the topic
without requiring an extensive background in computer science.
To appear in a special issue of the journal Collegiate Microcomputing, volume X, 1992.
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The interested reader might pursue [12, 3, 4] and [7] for more detail about computer
viruses and their properties. The description in the next few sections of the origins of
computer viruses and their structure is derived from [12].
2 What is a Computer Virus?
The term computer virus is derived from and analogous to a biological virus. The word virus
itself is Latin for poison. Viral infections are spread by the virus (a small shell containing
genetic material) injecting its contents into a far larger body cell. The cell then is infected
and converted into a biological factory producing replicants of the virus.
Similarly, a computer virus is a segment of machine code (typically 200-4000 bytes)
that will copy its code into one or more larger "host" programs when it is activated. When
these infected programs are run, the viral code is executed and the virus spreads further.
Viruses cannot spread by infecting pure data; pure data is not executed. However, some
data, such as :files with spreadsheet input or text :files for editing, may be interpreted by
application programs. For instance, text files may contain special sequences of characters
that are executed as editor commands when the file is first read into the editor. Under
these circumstances, the data is "executed" and may spread a virus. Data :files may also
contain "hidden" code that is executed when the data is used by an application, and this
too may be infected. Technically speaking, however, pure data itself cannot be infected.
2.1 Worms
Worms are another form of software that is often referred to by the uninformed as a
computer virus. The Internet Worm of November 1988 is an example of one of these
programs.[10, 9]
Unlike viruses, worms are programs that can run independently and travel from machine
to machine across network connections; worms may have portions of themselves running on
many different machines. Worms do not change other programs, although they may carry
other code that does, such as a true virus.
In 1982, John Shoch and Jon Hupp of Xerox PARC (Palo Alto Research Center) de-
scribed the first computer worms. [8] They were working with an experimental, networked
environment using one of the first local area networks. While searching for something that
would use their networked environment, one of them remembered reading The Shockwave
Rider by John Brunner, written in 1975. This science fiction novel described programs
that traversed networks, carrying information with them. Those programs were called
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tapeworms in the novel. Shoch and Hupp named their own programs worms, because in
a similar fashion they would travel from workstation to workstation, reclaiming file space,
shutting off idle workstations, delivering mail, and doing other useful tasks.
Few computer worms have been written in the time since then, especially worms that
have caused damage, because they are not easy to write. Worms require a network envi-
ronment and an author who is familiar not only with the network services and facilities,
but also with the operating facilities required to support them once they have reached the
machine. The Internet worm incident of November, 1988 clogged machines and networks
as it spread, and is an example of a worm.
Worms have also appeared in other science fiction literature. Recent "cyberpunk" novels
such as Neuromancer by William Gibson [6] refer to worms by the term "virus." The media
has also often referred incorrectly to worms as viruses. This paper focuses only on viruses
as defined here. Many of the comments about viruses and artificial life may also be applied
to worm programs.
2.2 Other Threats
There are many other kinds of vandalware that are often referred to as viruses, including
bacteria, trojan horses, logic bombs, and trapdoors. These will not be described here. The
interested reader can find explanations in [12] and [4].
2.3 Names
As the authors of viruses generally do not name their work formally and do not come
forward to claim credit for their efforts, it is usually up to the community that discovers
a virus to name it. A virus name may be based on where it is first discovered or where a
major infection occurred, e.g., the Lehigh and Alameda viruses. Other times, the virus is
named after some definitive string or value used by the program, e.g., the Brain and Den
Zuk viruses. Sometimes, viruses are named after the number of bytes by which they extend
infected programs, such as the 1704 and 1280 viruses. Still others may be named after
software for which the virus shows an affinity, e.g., the dBase virus. In the remainder of
this paper, viruses are referred to by commonly-accepted names. Refer to [12] or [14] for
detailed lists of virus names and characteristics.
3
2.4 A history lesson
The first use of the term virus to refer to unwanted computer code occurred in 1972 in a
science fiction novel, When Harley Was One, by David Gerrold.1 The description of virus
in that book does not fit the currently-accepted definition of computer virus-a program
that alters other programs to include a copy of itself. Fred Cohen formally defined the term
computer virus in 1983. [3] At that time, Cohen was a graduate student at the University
of Southern California attending a security seminar. The idea of writing a computer virus
occurred to him, and in a week's time he put together a simple virus that he demonstrated
to the class. His advisor, Professor Len Adelman, suggested that he call his creation a
computer virus. Dr. Cohen's thesis and later research were devoted to computer viruses.
It appears, however, that computer viruses were being written by other individuals,
although not named such, as early as 1981 on Apple II computers.2 Some early Apple II
viruses included the notorious "Festering Hate," "Cyberaids," and "Elk Cloner" strains.
Sometimes virus infections were mistaken as trojan horses, as in the "Zlink virus," [sic]
which was a case of the Zlink communication program infected by "Festering Hate." The
"Elk Cloner" virus was first reported in mid-1981.
It is only within the last three years that the problem of viruses has grown to significant
proportions. Since the first detected infection by the Brain virus in January 1986, up to
31 December, 1990, the number of distinctly different IBM PC viruses grew to over 225.
IT current trends continue, one projection estimates that by 1 January 1994 we will have
almost 39,00 different strains of virus for the IBM PC alone! Examined another way, in
1989, a new virus appeared every week; in 1990, a new virus appeared approximately every
two days; in 1991, we are seeing about six new viruses every day.[13]
The problem is not restricted to the IBM PC, and viruses now affect all popular personal
computers. Mainframe viruses do exist for a variety of operating systems and machines,
but all reported to date have been experimental in nature, written by serious academic
researchers in controlled environments.3
Where viruses have flourished is in the weak security environment of the personal com-
puter. Personal computers were originally designed for a single dedicated user - little, if
any, thought was given to the difficulties that might arise should others have even indirect
access to the machine. The systems contained no security facilities beyond an optional key
switch, and there was a minimal amount of security-related software available to safeguard
1
The recent reissue of Gerrold's book has this subplot omitted.
2
Private communication from Joe Dellinger.
3
E.g., the UNIX virus described in [5].
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data. Today, however, personal computers are being used for tasks far different from those
originally envisioned, including managing company databases and participating in networks
of computer systems. Unfortunately, their hardware and operating systems are still based
on the assumption of single trusted user access, and this allows computer viruses to flourish
on those machines.
2.5 Formal structure
True viruses have two major components: one that handles the spread of the virus, and
a manipulation task. The manipulation task may not be present (has null effect), or it
may act like a logic bomb, awaiting a set of predetermined circumstances before triggering.
These two virus components will be described in general terms, and then more specific
examples will be presented as they relate to the most common personal computer: the IBM
PC. Viruses on other machines behave in a similar fashion.
2.5.1 A Note About Mainframe Viruses
As already noted, viruses can infect minicomputers and mainframes as well as personal
computers. Laboratory experiments conducted by various researchers have shown that
any machine with almost any operating system can support computer viruses. However,
there have been no documented cases of true viruses on large multi-user computers other
than as experiments. This is caused by, in part, both the greater restrictions built into
the software and hardware of those machines, and the way they are usually used. My
further comments will therefore be directed towards PC viruses, with the understanding
that analogous statements could be made about mainframe viruses.
2.5.2 Structure
For a computer virus to work, it somehow must add itself to other executable code. The
viral code must be executed before the code of its infected host (if the host code is ever
executed again). One form of classification of computer viruses is based on the three ways
a virus may add itself to host code: as a shell, as an add-on, and as intrusive code.
Shell viruses A shell virus is one that forms a "shell" (as in "eggshell" rather than "Unix
shell") around the original code. In effect, the virus becomes the program, and the original
host program becomes an internal subroutine of the viral code. An extreme example of this
would be a case where the virus moves the original code to a new location and takes on
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Figure 1: Shell Virus Infection
Add-on viruses Most viruses are add-on viruses. They function by appending their
code to the end of the host code, or by relocating the host code and adding their own code
to the beginning. The add-on virus then alters the startup information of the program,
executing the viral code before the code for the main program. The host code is left almost
completely untouched; the only visible indication that a virus is present is that the file
grows larger.
Intrusive viruses Intrusive viruses operate by replacing some or all of the original host
code with viral code. The replacement might be selective, as in replacing a subroutine with
the virus, or inserting a new interrupt vector and routine. The replacement may also be
extensive, as when large portions of the host program are completely replaced by the viral













Figure 2: Add-on Virus Infection
2.5.3 Triggers
Once a virus has infected a program, it seeks to spread itself to other programs, and
eventually to other systems. Simple viruses do no more than this, but most viruses are not
simple viruses. Common viruses wait for a specific triggering condition, and then perform
some activity. The activity can be as simple as printing a message to the user, or as complex
as seeking particular data items in a specific file and changing their values. Often, viruses
are destructive, removing files or reformatting entire disks.
The conditions that trigger viruses can be arbitrarily complex. If it is possible to write
a program to determine a set of conditions, then those same conditions can be used to
trigger a virus. This includes waiting for a specific date or time, determining the presence or
absence of a specific set of files (or their contents), examining user keystrokes for a sequence
of input, examining display memory for a specific pattern, or checking file attributes for
modification and permission information. Viruses also may be triggered based on some
random event. One common trigger component is a counter used to determine how many
additional programs the virus has succeeded in infecting-the virus does not trigger until
it has propagated itself a certain minimum number of times. Of course, the trigger can be





Figure 3: Intrusive Virus Infection
2.6 How do viruses spread?
Computer viruses can infect any form of writable storage, including hard disk, floppy disk,
tape, optical media, or memory. Infections can spread when a computer is booted from an
infected disk, or when an infected program is run. It is important to realize that often the
chain of infection can be complex and convoluted. A possible infection might spread in the
following way:
• A client brings in a diskette with a program that is malfunctioning (because of a viral
infection) .
• The consultant runs the program to discover the cause of the bug-the virus spreads
into the memory of the consultant's computer.
• The consultant copies the program to another disk for later investigation-the virus
infects the copy utility on the hard disk.
• The consultant moves on to other work preparing a letter-the virus infects the screen
editor on the hard disk.
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• The system is switched off and rebooted the next day-the virus is cleared from
memory, only to be reinstalled when either the screen editor or copy utility is used
next.
• Someone invokes the infected screen editor across a network link, thus infecting their
own system.
2.7 The three stages of a virus's life
For a virus to spread, its code must be executed. This can occur either as the direct result
of a user invoking an infected program, or indirectly through the system executing the code
as part of the system boot sequence or a background administration task.
The virus then replicates, infecting other programs. It may replicate into only one
program at a time, it may infect some randomly-chosen set of programs, or it may infect
every program on the system. Sometimes a virus will replicate based on some random event
or on the current value of the clock. The different methods will not be presented in detail
because the result is the same: there are additional copies of the virus on your system.
Finally, most viruses incorporate a manipulation task that can consist of a variety of
effects (some odd, some malevolent) indicating the presence of the virus. Typical manip-
ulations might include amusing screen displays, unusual sound effects, system reboots, or
the reformatting of the user's hard disk.
2.7.1 Activating a virus
The IBM PC can be used as an example to illustrate how a virus is activated. Viruses in
other types of computer systems behave in similar manners.
The IBM PC boot sequence This section gives a description of the various points in
the IBM PC boot sequence that can be infected by a virus. I will not go into extensive
detail about the operations at each of these stages; the interested reader may consult the
operations manuals of these systems, or any of the many "how-to" books available.
The IBM PC boot sequence has six components:
• ROM BIOS routines
• Partition record code execution
• Boot sector code execution
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• IO.SYS and MSDOS.SYS code execution
• COMMAND.COM command shell execution
• AUTOEXEC.BAT batch file execution
ROM BIOS When an IBM PC, or compatible PC, is booted, the machine executes
a set of routines in ROM (read-only memory). These routines initialize the hardware and
provide a basic set of input/output routines that can be used to access the disks, screen, and
keyboard of the system. These routines constitute the basic input/output system (BIOS).
ROM routines cannot be infected by viral code (except at the manufacturing stage),
as they are present in read-only memory that cannot be modified by software. Some
manufacturers now provide extended ROMs containing further components of the boot
sequence (e.g., partition record and boot sector code). This trend reduces the opportunities
for viral infection, but also may reduce the flexibility and configurability of the final system.
Partition Record The ROM code executes a block of code stored at a well-known
location on the hard disk (head 0, track 0, sector 1). The IBM PC disk operating system
(DOS) allow!, a hard disk unit to be divided into up to four logical partitions. Thus, a 100Mb
hard disk could be divided into one 60Mb and two 20Mb partitions. These partitions are
seen by DOS as separate drives: "C," "D," and so on. The size of each partition is stored
in the partition record, as is a block of code responsible for locating a boot block on one of
the logical partitions.
The partition record code can be infected by a virus, but the code block is only 446
bytes in length. Thus, a common approach is to hide the original partition record at a
known location on the disk, and then to chain to this sector from the viral code in the
partition record. This is the technique used by the New Zealand virus, discovered in 1988.
(See figures 4 and 5.)
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Figure 5: Hard disk after infection by New Zealand Virus
Boot sectors The partition record code locates the first sector on the logical partition,
known as the boot sector. (If a floppy disk is inserted, the ROM will execute the code in
its boot sector, head 0, track 0, sector 1.) The boot sector contains the BIOS parameter
block (BPB). The BPB contains detailed information on the layout of the filing system on
disk, as well as code to locate the file IO.SYS. That file contains the next stage in the boot






Figure 6: Floppy disk before infection
A common use of the boot sector is to execute an application program, such as a game,
automatically; unfortunately, this can include automatic initiation of a virus. Thus, the
boot sector is a common target for infection.
Available space in the boot sector is limited, too (a little over 460 bytes is available).
Hence, the technique of relocating the original boot sector while filling the first sector with
viral code is also used here.
A typical example of such a "boot sector" virus is the Alameda virus. This virus relocates
the original boot sector to track 39, sector 8, and replaces it with its own viral code. (See
Figure 7.)
Other well-known boot sector viruses include the New Zealand (on floppy only), Brain,
Search, and Italian viruses. Boot sector viruses are particularly dangerous because they
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Figure 7: After Alameda Virus Infection
MSDOS.SYS, IO.SYS The boot sector next loads the IO.SYS file, which carries
out further system initialization, then loads the DOS system contained in the MSDOS.SYS
file. Both these files could be subject to viral infection, although no known viruses target
them.
Command shell The MSDOS.SYS code next executes the command shell program
(COMMAND.COM). This program provides the interface with the user, allowing execu-
tion of commands from the keyboard. The COMMAND.COM program can be infected,
as can any other .COM or .EXE executable binary file.
The COMMAND.COM file is the specific target ofthe Lehigh virus that struck Lehigh
University in November 1987. This virus caused corruption of hard disks after it had spread
to four additional COMMAND.COM files.
AUTOEXEC batch files The COMMAND. COM program is next in the boot
sequence. It executes a list of commands stored in the AUTOEXEC.BAT file. This is
simply a text file full of commands to be executed by the command interpreter. A virus
could modify this file to include execution of itself. Ralf Burger has described how to do
exactly that in his book Computer Viruses-A High Tech Disease. His virus uses line editor
commands to edit its code into batch files. Although a curiosity, such a virus would be
slow to replicate and easy to spot. This technique is not used by any known viruses "in the
wild."
Infection of a user program A second major group of viruses spreads by infecting
program code files. To infect a code file, the virus must insert its code in such a way that
it is executed before its infected host program. These viruses come in two forms:
Overwriting The virus writes its code directly over the host program, destroying part or
all of its code. The host program will no longer execute correctly after infection.
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N on-overwriting The virus relocates the host code, so that the code is intact and the
host program can execute normally.
A common approach used for .COM files is to exploit the fact that many of them
contain a jump to the start of the executable code. The virus may infect the programs by
storing this jump, and then replacing it with a jump to its own code. When the infected
program is run, the virus code is executed. When the virus finishes, it jumps to the start
of the program's original code using the stored jump address. (See Figure 8.)
~L- H_os_t C_o_d_e__----'LC__t
~ I
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Figure 8: Infection of user applications
Notice that in the case of the overwriting virus, the more complex infection strategy
often means that all but a small block of the original program is intact. This means that the
original program can be started, although often it will exhibit sporadic errors or abnormal
behavior.
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Memory-resident viruses The most "successful" viruses to date exploit a variety of
techniques to remain resident in memory once their code has been executed and their host
program has terminated. This implies that, once a single infected program has been run,
the virus potentia.lly can spread to any or all programs in the system. This spreading
occurs during the entire work session (until the system is rebooted to clear the virus from
memory), rather than during a small period of time when the infected program is executing
viral code.
Thus, the two categories of memory-resident virus are:
Transient The viral code is active only when the infected portion of the host program is
being executed.
Resident The virus copies itself into a block of memory and arranges to remain active after
the host program has terminated. The viruses are also known as TSR (Terminate
and Stay Resident) viruses.
Examples of memory-resident viruses are all known boot sector viruses, the Israeli, Cascade,
and Traceback viruses.
If a virus is present in memory after an application exits, how does it remain active?
That is, how does the virus continue to infect other programs? The answer is that it also
infects the standard interrupts used by DOS and the BIOS so that it is invoked by other
applications when they make service requests.
The IBM PC uses many interrupts (both hardware and software) to deal with asyn-
chronous events and to invoke system functions. All services provided by the BIOS and DOS
are invoked by the user storing parameters in machine registers, then causing a software
interrupt.
When an interrupt is raised, the operating system calls the routine whose address it
finds in a special table known as the vector or interrupt table. Normally, this table contains
pointers to handler routines in the ROM or in memory-resident portions of the DOS (see
figure 9). A virus can modify this table so that the interrupt causes viral code (resident in
memory) to be executed.
By trapping the keyboard interrupt, a virus can arrange to intercept the CTRL-ALT-
DEL soft reboot command, modify user keystrokes, or be invoked on each keystroke. By
trapping the BIOS disk interrupt, a virus can intercept all BIOS disk activity, including
reads of boot sectors, or disguise disk accesses to infect as part of a user's disk request.
By trapping the DOS service interrupt, a virus can intercept all DOS service requests








Figure 9: Normal interrupt usage
A typical virus might trap the DOS service interrupt, causing its code to be executed








Figure 10: Interrupt vectors with TSR virus
2.7.2 Replication strategies
Types Viruses can be grouped into four categories, based on the type of files they infect:
• Boot sector viruses that only infect boot sectors (or rarely, partition records)
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• System viruses that are targeted against particular system files, such as the DOS
command shell
• Direct viruses that scan through the DOS directory structure on disk looking for
suitable files to infect
• Indirect viruses that wait until the user carries out an activity on a file (e.g., execution
of a program) before infecting it
Transient viruses are always direct in that they attempt to infect one or more files
(usually in the same directory or home directory) before terminating. Resident viruses
can be either direct or indirect (or worse, both). The recently reported Traceback virus
infects any file executed (indirect), while also incrementally scanning the directory structure
(direct).
In general, indirect viruses are slower to spread, but often pass unnoticed as their
infection activities are disguised among other disk access requests.
Signatures to prevent reinfection One problem encountered by viruses is that of
repeated infection of the host, leading to depleted memory and early detection. In the
case of boot sector viruses, this could (depending on strategy) cause a long chain of linked
sectors. In the case of a program-infecting virus (or link virus), repeated infection may
result in continual extension of the host program each time it is reinfected. There are
indeed some viruses that exhibit this behavior (e.g., the Israeli virus extends .EXE files
1808 bytes each time they are infected).
To prevent this unnecessary growth of infected files, many viruses implant a unique
signature that signals that the file or sector is infected. The virus will check for this
signature before attempting infection, and will place it when infection has taken place; if
the signature is present, the virus will not reinfect the host.
A virus signature can be a characteristic sequence of bytes at a known offset on disk or
in memory, a specific feature of the directory entry (e.g., alteration time or file length), or
a special system call available only when the virus is active in memory.
The signature is a mixed blessing. The virus would be easier to spot if reinfections
caused disk space to be exhausted or showed obvious disk activity, but the signature does
provide a method of detection and protection. Virus sweep programs are available that
scan files on disk for the signatures of known viruses, as are "inoculation" routines that
fake the viral signature in clean systems to prevent the virus from attempting infection.
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2.8 Other Characteristics
Recent viruses exhibit "stealth" characteristics that prevent their detection and elimination.
These viruses set intercepts of system interrupts to alter data returned by BIOS calls, thus
"sanitizing" buffers that might otherwise show the virus code. Some viruses, referred to
as "stage 4" viruses, encrypt themselves when infecting a program. This prevents virus
scanning programs from detecting them, because they have no distinctive pattern for which
to scan.
Even without stealth characteristics, viruses have spread widely. One study of over 2500
large computer installations show that the incidence of computer virus infections is growing
exponentially. The rate of growth shown in that study is greater than 3% per month, and
over 10% if incidents affected more than 25 machines at a time.[13] Experience with these
viruses indicate that the majority are strains written over two years ago but that are now
making a significant impact.
3 Reasons
There have been many reasons given for the writing of computer viruses. Each has been
an attempt to justify the propriety of writing a computer virus.
In the following sections, I will outline the most common reasons given, and briefly
discuss the suggested rationale. This discussion is not a rigorous philosophical discussion,
but rather a practical view by a computer scientist. The reader is left to draw his or her
own conclusions based on personal ethics.
3.1 Experimentation
Undoubtedly, some viruses have been written as experiments. Work by Cohen and Duff,
for instance, fall into this category.[3, 5] However, very few instances of virus writing are
appropriate with this as a rationale.
Experiments, when done appropriately, involve careful formulation of both a main hy-
pothesis and a null hypothesis. This allows the research to distinguish the results from a
random occurrence. Next, the experiment is conducted under a carefully controlled set of
circumstances where observations are noted. When sufficient data has been collected, the
experiment is stopped.
Computer viruses, when released into an uncontrolled population, fail to meet the re-
quirements of good science. Although a hypothesis may have been formulated ("I bet this
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will really wreak havoc!"), a carefully formulated null hypothesis is seldom present. The
experiment is not well-controlled as the author has no control over the spread of the virus,
and no capability of closely observing effects over time. Furthermore, many viruses never
"expire." Instead, the viruses continue to spread from machine to machine.
Perhaps the biggest problem with the excuse of "experimentation" is that the subjects
have not given informed consent. A pervasive concept within the scientific community is
that when people are involved in an experiment, they should be informed of the conse-
quences and side-effects, and allowed to choose whether or not they want to participate.
Peoplewlio find their computers infected with a virus have not given this informed consent,
and they are victims rather than experimental subjects.
Claiming that writing of computer viruses is experimental is akin to saying that mixing
chemicals together in a flask to see if it explodes is a scientific experiment. Worse, the flask
is then placed inside an unmarked box and put on a supermarket shelf for unsuspecting
shoppers to detonate. Although a computer virus is not as life-threatening as a bomb, the
analogy is reasonable because of the damage that can be caused to an unsuspecting victim.
3.2 Education
Some virus authors have claimed that they have written viruses to further their knowledge
of how PCs work. This is an excuse that is often given by people who break into computer
systems - they claim they are learning about computer security.[ll] As an educator, I
would equate this with the claim that one can learn more about automotive engineering by
putting sugar in the gas tank and setting fire to the upholstery.
To learn more about how a computer works, one should study the manuals an literature,
and build some projects. Writing a full-screen editor would provide as much (or more)
education about how a particular computer works than would writing a virus. Writing and
then releasing a virus provides no educational value that cannot be achieved otherwise, and
with far less damage to others.
3.3 Accident
The claim that the release of a virus was accidental is closely related to the attempts to
justify virus-writing as an experimental or educational activity. The authors claim that
they wrote the virus for one of those purposes and it "escaped" by accident.
Certainly, accidents do happen. However, one must look at the underlying reason the
virus was written. Using an "accident" as an excuse does not justify the writing of the virus
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in the first place. Even if the virus was written for a legitimate purpose (something I argue
is unlikely), the accidental release likely evidences careless or reckless behavior. Fires and
explosions cannot be excused away by accidents, and neither can viruses. If a researcher
were doing work with recombinent DNA on the bacilli that cause Black Plague, and the
bacilli accidently escaped the laboratory, the researcher would still be morally culpable.
3.4 Political Statements
Many computer viruses have been written that convey some political message when acti-
vated. The Den Zuk, Peace, and Dukakis viruses are all examples of this;[12] a more recent
example is the "Evil Empire" virus.[1]
In general, we may see some activities as morally justified, even if they are illegal. The
peaceful demonstrations of Ghandi and Martin Luther King, for example, were illegal but
most people today view them of high moral character because of the wrongs they sought
to correct. Even in the realm of computers, computer tampering in support of a political
agenda may be viewed as somewhat heroic, such as protesting an oppressive communist
government. [2]
The case of computer viruses is not quite the same, however. Viruses disrupt the
systems of the supporters as well as the opponents of any particular cause. Furthermore,
the virus is likely to be around far longer than some of the causes espoused: the Den Zuk
virus made statements about Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, both of whom are no
longer in office; the Dukakis virus was written well in advance of the 1988 US Presidential
campaign and Michael Dukakis has now dropped from public life; and the Evil Empire
virus has been rendered moot by Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent withdrawl of
troops. Unfortunately, all of these viruses are likely to remain in the population of personal
computers indefinitely.
Using a virus as a form of political expression is more an act of terrorism than a sophis-
ticated political statement. Rather than garnering sympathy from a selected audience, it is
likely to antagonize potential supporters. As an act of terrorism, its ethical nature should
be obvious.
3.5 Not Illegal, Boredom
A great number of viruses have recently appeared from authors in Eastern European coun-
tries, particularly Bulgaria. Some of the virus authors have been identified. When ques-
tioned about their motives, they have responded that they write the viruses because they
are bored and because there are no laws against it (in their countries).
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This is obviously a silly excuse. Common vandalism of all kinds is often explained as
being the result of boredom, but it does not make the activity ethical. The damage caused
by computer viruses is global in scope and may cost hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
Boredom certainly does not justify this amount of havoc, especially when there are other
outlets for challenge and interest (e.g., writing applications or games).
Some philosophical systems state that society determines ethics through its laws. Under
those philosophies, the fact that there are no laws against writing viruses might seem to
make virus-authorship ethical. However, the viruses have continued to propagate to locales
where there are laws against such behavior. The authors know this, but continue to write
new viruses; their concern is not whether the activity is illegal somewhere else, and thus
potentially unethical. Rather, their concern is whether they may be caught and punished
locally. This shows their awareness that their activity may be unethical and harmful. It
also explains why very few viruses ever carry identification indicating the original author.
4 Concluding Remarks
Some other reasons have rarely been given to explain the writing of computer viruses, but
I have never seen documented evidence that they were offered by actual virus authors.
Instead, they have been speculation by others as to the reasons why the viruses are being
written. Noteriety and blackmail are two examples of these other reasons, for instance. A
little thought about these justifications should suffice to discern their ethical nature.
We have three methods of limiting the writing and spread of new viruses. One way
is to improve the security of our existing and future computing base. Unfortunately, the
vast investment in software and hardware make any such improvement limited in scope and
distribution. Most computers are used for business and educational purposes, and putting
awkward or expensive constraints on those systems would render them unsuitable for their
intended purposes. Only through slow evolution of systems brought to market will we be
able to transition to safer systems. This is indeed unfortunate, as this is the only sure way
to limit the spread of many forms of computer virus.
A second method of limiting computer virus spread is to legislate and enforce strict
laws and penalties against the writing of computer viruses. This is unlikely to have much
effect, however, for two reasons. First, it would require the uniform effort of governments
world-wide to pass such laws. It is not currently possible to get the nations of the world to
agree on simpler issues such as those of intellectual property - it seems unlikely that there
will be any universal computer virus laws anytime soon. Second, investigation of computer
virus writing is very, very difficult. Unless an investigator is extremely lucky, or an author
admits under oath to having written a virus, it would seem to be almost impossible to
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prove guilt in a court of law. To date, in five years of malicious virus writing with many
hundreds of viruses released, I am unaware of any prosecution being initiated in either a
criminal or civil court against a virus author.
The third method to defeat computer viruses is to inculcate a sense of shared moral
outrage about the writing of computer viruses. As a community of professionals, we should
realize the threat to our profession and futures posed by computer viruses (and other
vandalware). Some limited thought on the subject, along the lines give in the preceding
section, should make it obvious that there is no justification for anyone to ever write a virus
and release it. We should make this clear to our peers, our students, and our employers. We
need to make it clear that writing viruses is not done for "fun," and neither is it acceptable
behavior.
Developing a sense of community against the development of viruses will not eliminate
them, certainly. It may, however, help discourage the developers of viruses who currently
give little thought as to the effects and scope of the results. Unfortunately, even if no new
viruses were ever written, we would continue to face the untoward effects of the existing
viruses for years to come. It is never too late, however, to do what is right.
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